Category Archives: termitic screens

The Darker Side of the Backchannel, Part 1

Toward the end of last year, a somewhat extended discussion took place on one of the listservs I subscribe to. The post that started the discussion was titled “The Dark Side of the Backchannel,” and it referenced a number of recent articles and blog entries that deal with the way Twitter is affecting the conference presentation. These articles and blog entries were of interest to the list, and likely sparked the longish thread, because the group that populates the list – nominally, a Computers and Writing crowd – had seen their own Twitter/conference speaker event at the last Computers & Writing conference in Davis, which I touched on briefly in this post, turn into precisely the sort of audience revolt that these pieces describe. To be more specific than I was in that post, one of the keynote speeches at C&W touched off a fairly aggressive (and perhaps insulting) Twitter feed backchannel. Apparently, the paid speaker was thought to be condescending to the audience, in addition to performing some finger-wagging routine on points that everyone in the field has known for years. The feed itself is pretty brutal on this point, and the whole thing resulted in much rending of garments and/or self-justification, in a style only paid academics can summon up.

Over the next couple of days I want to address what happened in the listserv discussion, and, through that, the notion of a backchannel more generally. For now, I’ll just lay out a number of points. My primary concern here is the form of the critique that has tended to come up when backchannels are critically assessed at all. As I see it, what’s lacking from these discussions is any sustained attempt to situate the backchannel phenomenon. At best, those addressing the issue have discussed the way a Twitter feed shifts the rhetorical situation of the conference talk, with perhaps some cursory nod to the history of public address. McCarthy ends his blog post with a quote from Rob Cunningham, which at least draws parallels between what’s happening in public address (and really, we’re talking about a very specific genre of academic discourse) and what’s happening for newspapers and the recording industry. Fine. About forty minutes discussing contemporary social technologies would lead an undergraduate to that point, but it’s still well taken. The problem, of course, is that the ways even serious observers situate and discuss the linked phenomena are not terribly compelling. At worst, the discussions turn into rather naive anarchic sloganism (“Eliminate authority. Eliminate focus” says one poster on the listserv), or devolve into – and this is really the primary focus for many – concern for the personal feelings of the speaker – or arguments against such concern (“This might sound kinda bad, but I have a hard time trying to work up any sympathy for [insert speaker's name].”). Between these two species of points, you get all kinds of ideas about how to restructure the academic conference given the supposedly newly empowered audience, or you get various analogies to other forms of backchannels, and same-as-it-ever-was shoulder shrugging.

This is all fine, I guess, and I’m happy enough that people are talking about this stuff. What I want to suggest over the next couple of days, however, is that all this backchanelling has very little to do with the relationship between the speaker and the audience. Or rather, if the relationship between speaker and audience is changing, it is because both are being trained in novel subjective forms of contribution. In this sense, it doesn’t muych matter whether the backchannel turns into a nightmare of vicious snark, or cashes out as some paradise of collaborative knowledge building. It is the formal character of response that may hold the dangers. More on this in the coming days.

Figuring History in Postindustrialism

For me, one of the more interesting papers published in The Responsibilities of Rhetoric – the proceedings of the 2008 RSA Conference – is Richard Glejzer and Michael Bernard-Donals’ “Synecdoche as Figure of the Holocaust,” largely because it dovetails with Alan Liu’s recent collection of essays, Local Transcendence: Essays on Postmodern Historicism and the Database. Both pieces zoom in on and seek to explain the rhetorical work of the detail in contemporary historical writing, so I think I’ll discuss them together here.

Glejzer and Bernard-Donals are really starting, theoretically, with the problem of figuration in historical writing, building off the work of Hayden White, and his four tropes through which historians “structure” history (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony). At issue for Glejzer and Bernard-Donals is, first, which of these figures dominates Holocaust history, and, second, more expansively, what the dominant figure tells us about the historical event and our understanding of it. Specifically, the authors identify a purportedly metonymic method in Holocaust history writing that has dominated the field “since Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews” (really, the classic in the field, even 50 years after its first publication), and through the various memoirs and diaries and witnessings. The metonymic structure of these histories, the authors contend, proceeds by a detailed recitation of the “parts” that – both singly and through accumulation – points back to a whole as explanation or cause (220); you would presumably understand something of the Holocaust as some kind of substantive agent that produces the parts (the particular detail) as patient of that agent. But Glejzer and Bernard-Donals find something very different in Daniel Mendelsohn’s memoir, The Lost: A Search for Six of the Six Million. While the memoir would seem, on its surface, to be structured according to the same metonymic logic of historical figuration, it actually, Glejzer and Bernard-Donals argue, operates by synecdoche. If metonymy points back to a whole as cause, synecdoche functions rather as a “part-for-part substitution, in which the associative relation implies a whole rather than expresses it as part of the substitutive relation” (220). It points back to the “hole” rather than the “whole” of the historical event, some essential caesura or excess that, because it is the real – escapes the method of detail, and any method of telling, for that matter.

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In the Shadow of the Twittering Majorities

I spent the last weekend out in Davis, CA and environs, doing the Computers & Writing (C&W) conference thing. My colleague JP and I have been going to this conference every year for the last several, and we usually have a good time. Same this year. The new thing at the conference this year was a Twitter feed that displayed various participants tweets (is there a more obnoxious term?), many of them directly from some presentation room or other. So, you’d go into the break/registration room, and you’d supposedly get a sense of what was going on in the panels that you were not then attending. You could also go back to the feed to see what people had to tweet (ugh) about your panel. All of this, of course, ends up being presented as some kind of openness, and presumably we’re supposed to learn something from all that tweeting (yuck!). The question here, I guess, is whether we actually do.

As anyone breathing is now fully aware of, Twitter is now somehow implicated in the events going on in Iran—so much so that otherwise careful commentators have fallen into the whole “Twitter Revolution” rhetoric as if it’s some kind of obvious fact. The supposedly political use of Twitter washing over the infosphere was thus a frequent topic of discussion at the conference, with most people that I saw entering into rather unqualified celebration of whole thing. I should remind you all at this point that the conference was not made up of Iran experts, but—and I hesitate to say this—Twitter experts, or experts in the use of new writing technologies and rhetoric. But this may be the correct group to stand in as an instance of the general phenomenon, since all the twitter about the tweets from Tehran seems to be much more about Twitter than Tehran. In any case, I’d eat my hat in the public square (supposing such a place still exists) if even a small fraction of the people currently celebrating the Twitter revolution know fuck-all about Iranian politics, culture, and history.  But this returns us to the other point.

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Three Dogmas of User-Centeredness

I guess I’ve been motivated to say all this for a while, but the real spur was an article I read the other day that tries to navigate a course for the future of usability studies, “User-Centered Technology in Participatory Culture: Two Decades ‘Beyond a Narrow Conception of Usability Studies,’” by Robert R. Johnson, Michael Salvo, and Meredith Zoetewey. The real exigence for the article seems to be the sort of thing that almost always gets ink these days: positioning professional technical communicators as a necessary part of technology design processes. This is an old story by now. You can’t read the technical writing literature for a day without coming across the deep anxiety about the the effects of disintermediation on the technical communicator role. Because this role has been so classically tied to a position of intermediary (between scientific experts and a lay public), its collapse in post-Fordist economies has sent everybody even faintly associated with the discipline into frantic redefinition mode. The problem, to state it quickly, is that in disciplinary societies (that is, Fordist-Taylorist economies) that maintained strict differentiation of functions (which is to say, a division of and within manual and mental labor, combined with a division of production and consumption), the technical communicator actually played a significant role, because the functional divisions produced distinctions in knowledge and capacities, and thus required the labor of an intermediary. As the partitions and divisions of the old disciplinary apparatuses start to fall apart, along with the temporal rhythms of the production process, these distinctions no longer hold. Not only is technical knowledge dispersed over a wide swath of the lay public (as every meth lab in Montana will readily attest to), but the experts and laypeople are often better at writing for and interacting with each other than the supposed intermediaries.

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Crowd Technologies, Part 2

As most of my readers will know, I’m not exactly Mr. Patriotism. Still, the following clips are interesting in all kinds of ways. The first is from the East Village in New York City, the second from Portland, Oregon. Both are places that have been told repeatedly over the last 20 years or so that they represent the worst of this country; they are rhetorically excised from the (imaginary) community as a matter of course. So it’s interesting to me, anyway, to see a kind of reclaiming of that imaginary status in this way. I think the deeply discriminatory and unjust results on the LGBT marriage and adoption propositions shows that we have a long way to go indeed. Still (and I hesitate to “but” or “still” it, given how horrendous those propositions actually are), these are remarkable rhetorical artifacts. Multitude?

The Myth of the Madding Crowd

I’m a little too busy right now to deal with this in detail, but I find the rhetoric of McCain/Palin’s “unhinged” crowds to be a very interesting development indeed, and one that deserves a careful tracing. It is, no doubt, more media narrative than “representation” of any change in GOP rallies, but its a curious narrative to deploy at this point. Ever since palin came out with her asinine “pals around with terrorists” jibe we’ve been treated to a LeBonesque contemplation of the crowd mind, all with a special focus on the “rabid” McCain/Palin rallies. Of course, this whole election season has been a study in crowd rhetorics, from the Hillary camp’s desperate insinuation that the Obama supporters were a “cult” to the cringingly stupid and tone deaf “celebrity” ads that McCain’s more retrograde advisors decided to go with in August (like everything else, they boomeranged on the painfully out-of touch McCainites when he picked the ultimate substanceless “celebrity” in Sarah Palin).

I’ll just suggest here, with the (no doubt fruitless) promise of picking the point up later, that we’re seeing the return of the classical 19th century crowd image at precisely the moment that the so-called “wisdom of crowds” – which was always, for James Suroweicki and his various disciples, merely synechdoche for the orderly operation of free markets in the Chicago School style – at precisely the moment when the wisdom of crowds, I say again, is collapsing at 20% a week. So what do we see emerge at once, during the same week?

  1. Panic on the financial markets, the collapse of the “wisdom of crowds” mantra that was always Friedmanite rational choice theory dressed up in a really laughable costume of physics.
  2. Atavistic irrational rage of the McCain/Palin mobs as they froth and sway across the media spectrum.

These are not unconnected narratives.

Smartest People in the Room…

Communism has to be about more than the redistribution of property. Who wants all this shit? – Antonio Negri and Felix Guattari, Communist Like Us

Yikes…. Wachovia trying to build up depleted cash reserves. Ain’t post-Keynesianism grand?

Yesterday, Bair, President Bush and other senior regulators made a concerted effort to reassure people that their money is safe and that the nation’s banking system is sound. Noting that the vast majority of banks remain well-capitalized, Bair said it had been an “uphill battle” to counter false rumors and restore calm among investors and bank customers.

“This is not a serious situation. I would call it challenging, increasingly challenging,” she said in an interview. “We’ve had five bank failures this year. That is not huge. . . . I don’t want to overreact or underreact, but let’s get the facts. We are at a very low level of failures compared to previous cycles of economic distress.”

Why am I having flashbacks of Ken Lay telling all the Enron employees that everything’s fine and they should stick with the company stock? It’s always fun to note that despite all the complex economic theorizing, the whole shabang actually and virtually runs on little more than particular affective attachments:

In California, police were called to calm crowds of anxious customers…The current environment is risky for financial firms. Rumors and false reports can trigger a run on a bank even if it is well-capitalized. Two institutions have been sunk by such panics this year, the 85-year-old brokerage house Bear Stearns and IndyMac.

Crowds! Rumors! Panic! Lesson: disturbances in the crowd ecology are rhetorical, and can only be countered rhetorically: don’t worry…you’re covered.

Well, we’re covered, alright…

Empirical Proof of Burkean Identification (or, Keep Copying Me!)

OK. I know this isn’t really what Burke means by identification, but I could think of no more sizzling a headline than one that suggest scientists have confirmed, through rigorous experimentation, a theory of persuasion Kenneth Burke put forth more than half a century ago. Can you feel your skin tingling?

An article in yesterday’s Science Times, aptly titled You Remind Me of Me, describes a series of studies that sought to test the persuasive effects of mimicry. We learn that, for example “[p]sychologists have been studying the art of persuasion for nearly a century.” Well, I’m glad someone’s on that project for nearly a century. I hear other people have been at it for 2,400 years, but I guess they don’t rate for the Science Times! In any case, the major upshot is that our diligent psychologists have “found that immediate social bonding between strangers is highly dependent on mimicry, a synchronized and usually unconscious give and take of words and gestures that creates a current of good will between two people.” Wow. Who knew?

More interesting is that such imitation effects are produced through distinctly physical sorts of mimicry:

In a recent experiment, Rick van Baaren, a psychologist at Nijmegen University in the Netherlands, had student participants go to a lab and give their opinions about a series of advertisements. A member of his research team mimicked half the participants while they spoke, roughly mirroring the posture and the position of their arms and legs, taking care not to be too obvious.

Minutes later, the experimenter dropped six pens on the floor, making it look like an accident.

In several versions of this simple sequence, participants who had been mimicked were two to three times as likely to pick up the pens as those who had not.

And this:

The technique involved mirroring a person’s posture and movements, with a one- to two-second delay. If he crosses his legs, then wait two seconds and do the same, with opposite legs. If she touches her face, wait a beat or two and do that. If he drums his fingers or taps a toe, wait again and do something similar.

All this has, of course, been well-known to people who study the language of persuasion for quite some time, but I think we are only recently getting to the physical processes that work in language itself. As the article notes, “Rhythm counts.” One, two, three, four. A University of Chicago neuroscientist puts it this way: “When you’re being mimicked in a good way, it communicates a kind of pleasure, a social high you’re getting from the other person, and I suspect it activates the areas of the brain involved in sensing reward.” I remain suspicious of these quick evolutionary explanations involving the “regions of the brain” and especially “sensing reward,” which strikes me as the continued bizarre insertion of exchange logics into brain function. They can’t help but locate the social within the individual, but I think the focus on pleasure is probably close. The point would be to think pleasure neither in a reward structure nor as an individual effect, but as a social phenomenon. Your pleasure center isn’t in your brain, but in your brain’s connectivity to other brains and things: the brain-Twinkie complex, which of course includes the sugar refinery and capitalism. Yum yum. We’re not close to that yet in psychology (except, perhaps, in works like those of Merlin Donald), but it’s also why rhetoricians don’t rate for the Science Times.

As with any discussion of persuasion, the Times reverts back to the that bad old fear of being touched, closing the article with standard disclaimers about all that bad bad bad manipulative persuasion. Scary. We learn that the force of mimicry can be misused, and that “[e]veryone has the right to be charmed but not seduced.” So, in a sense, we end where we really began:

“Stop copying me!”

“Stop copying me.”

“Stop it!”

Stop it…

Cracking the Starling Code

A remarkable study was published yesterday in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The researchers were seeking empirical explanations of collective animal behavior, specifically, the swarming and flocking behavior of starlings. How do starling flocks manage to maintain cohesion, even with rapid directional changes. How do the flocks self-organize? These sorts of studies have exploded over the last ten to fifteen years, as researchers in fields as various as biology, physics, economics, robotics, graphic design, and (humbly) rhetoric have sought to make sense of crowd and swarm phenomena.

The answer to the flocking problem has usually been presented as a “nearest neighbor” operation, which is to say, each bird functions according to a specific algorithm that “programs” responses based on the actions of several other birds in the vicinity. The key here is that flock behavior (and other sorts of crowd behavior, we might suggest, though serious scientists would tell loopy humanities people like me not to stretch empirical work into vague analogies) relies on metric distance: how close birds are to other birds. The current study overturns that long-standing position, arguing instead that flock behavior relies on “topological distance,” or the relative position of, and number of birds between, six to seven other birds, regardless of metric distance (within a given range, of course). This explanation – based on a method of empirical observation and 3D modeling – would seem to account for fluctuations in flock density in a way that metric distance would not.

I just read through the study, so I’ll have to turn over its implications before I irresponsibly and haphazardly apply them to rhetorical interactions (more motion, Mr. Burke!) , but I do find the notion of topological distance interesting. First, I think this causes big problems for prevailing cellular automata theory that continues to operate on nearest neighbor principles. Second, we can now see flocks as cut through with numerous dispersed packs; on a conceptual level, this makes more sense to me than a kind of jigsaw puzzle aggregation of nearest neighbor units. A new day in the study of immanence? Maybe!

For now, Starling Formations over Termini Station, Rome (the study took its starling data from this location):